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To what extent do children believe in real, unreal, natural and supernatural figures relative to each other, and to 
what extent are features of culture responsible for belief? Are some figures, like Santa Claus or an alien, perceived 
as more real than figures like Princess Elsa or a unicorn? We categorized 13 figures into five a priori categories 
based on 1) whether children receive direct evidence of the figure’s existence, 2) whether children receive indirect 
evidence of the figure’s existence, 3) whether the figure was associated with culture-specific rituals or norms, and 
4) whether the figure was explicitly presented as fictional. We anticipated that the categories would be endorsed 
in the following order: ‘Real People’ (​a person known to the child, The Wiggles​), ‘Cultural Figures’ (​Santa Claus, The 
Easter Bunny, The Tooth Fairy​), ‘Ambiguous Figures’ (​Dinosaurs, Aliens​), ‘Mythical Figures’ (​unicorns, ghosts, 
dragons​), and ‘Fictional Figures’ (​Spongebob Squarepants, Princess Elsa, Peter Pan​). In total, we analysed responses 
from 176 children (aged 2 - 11 years) and 56 adults for ‘how real’ they believed 13 individual figures were (95 
children were examined online by their parents, and 81 children were examined by trained research assistants). A 
cluster analysis, based exclusively on children’s ‘realness’ scores, revealed a structure supporting our hypotheses, 
and multilevel regressions revealed a sensible hierarchy of endorsement with differing developmental trajectories 
for each category of figures. We advance the argument that cultural rituals are a special form of testimony that 
influences children’s reality/fantasy distinctions,  and that rituals and norms for ‘Cultural Figures’ are a powerful 
and under-researched factor in generating and sustaining a child’s endorsement for a figure’s reality status. All our 
data and materials are publically available at ​https://osf.io/wurxy/​.  
 
 




Children’s understanding of the real and unreal tends to be largely nuanced and accurate ​[1–3]​. By the 
age of three children can distinguish between veridical, imagined, and pretend entities ​[4,5]​ and between 
superficial and actual features of objects ​[6]​. Even when children are incorrect, it is often due to systematic cultural 
factors rather than their own idiosyncrasies or cognitive abilities ​[7–9]​. And in such cases children still show 
accuracy on the properties and limits on the content of supernatural minds, suggesting a nuanced understanding 
of what such figures can and cannot know ​[3,10,11]​.  And yet we have little idea how various kinds of non-real 
figures are evaluated ​relative ​to each other: are different types of supernatural figures endorsed with more or less 
confidence, and can children sensibly admit ambiguity within the spectrum of their beliefs? 
Not all supernatural figures are created equal. Some are concerned in particular domains of life or 
behavior, while some are not ​[12]​. Some act upon the world in direct ways, while others do not interact at all; the 
presence of some figures is conditional, such that a set of behaviors must be followed prior to, or in response to, 
the supernatural figure’s arrival. The latter is most true for the most famous of the child’s pantheon -- Santa Claus, 
The Easter Bunny, and The Tooth Fairy -- who, somewhat uniquely in the western/European canon, require those 
who believe to perform certain culturally sanctioned ritualistic actions. And while traditional forms of testimony 
certainly contribute to belief, we argue that it may not be a coincidence the supernatural figures commonly 
endorsed as real by children are the same figures who require children to act in particular, culturally sanctioned 
ways.  
Woolley and Ghossainy ​[13]​ argue that three factors can persuade a child of a figure’s veridicality: 
testimony, [indirect] evidence (e.g., chocolate eggs, or money left under a pillow), and ​‘engagement in rituals’ 
(e.g., leaving cookies out for Santa, hiding teeth, or actively searching for chocolate eggs; p. 1502) Additionally, 
Goldstein and Woolley ​[14]​ claim that [direct] evidence (i.e., engagement with Santa at a mall) reduces skepticism 
and predicts belief. Children use multiple forms of testimony to build beliefs about real and non-real figures, 
allowing for fantasy-reality distinctions that extends beyond a simple binary evaluation of real or not-real, and 
which may allow for sophisticated sub-categories and hierarchies (for a review see: ​[15,16]​.  
Cultural rituals and norms are only infrequently discussed as a form of testimony in the literature 
(perhaps due to the difficulty of experimental manipulation). And yet, there exist evidence of its importance. 
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Woolley, Boerger, & Markman (2004) created a fictional agent called ‘The Candy Witch’ in order to examine how a 
child’s understanding of supernatural figures develops. They created an induction process that involved two 
different experimenters arriving at a school on two separate occasions in the week preceding Halloween during 
which they described and presented an image of the Candy Witch (in this manner they created a sense of 
consensus). Children were told that The Candy Witch is a friendly witch who trades toys for the candy that children 
collect at Halloween. In order to summon the Candy Witch, there were multiple behavioral requirements: the child 
needed to refrain from eating some proportion of their collected candy to pay the Candy Witch, while the child’s 
parent needed to phone the witch to arrange the transaction. Across experiments this induction method led a 
majority of children to report that the Candy Witch was real ​[17,18]​. Among older children, participation in the 
behavioral aspects significantly increased endorsement of the reality of the Candy Witch above those who only 
heard about the witch, with some weak evidence suggesting that those who were visited, compared to those who 
were not, recalled more details about the Candy Witch one year later ​[17,18]​.  
In contrast, Piazza, Bering, and Ingram ​[19]​ created Princess Alice, but were unable to arouse in children a 
response consistent with belief in her. Children were simply provided testimony of Princess Alice: that she was 
magical, invisible, and present in the room. Children later engaged in a task in which they were afforded the 
opportunity to cheat. While 11 children (48%) professed belief in Princess Alice (5 were unsure, 7 did not) the 
‘presence’ of Princess Alice did not change their likelihood of cheating. Indeed, belief in Princess Alice did not 
significantly correlate with the child’s attempt to explore the place where she was ostensibly located in the room, 
nor even with looking in her direction (subsequent research has also failed to find positive results; see Kapitány, 
Reindl, Nielsen, under review; ​[20]​. These results suggest that children’s beliefs are not so easily manipulated. We 
describe Princess Alice and the Candy Witch as generalizable for larger real world beliefs, and argue that the 
degree of behavioral involvement required on the part of children and the conspirators aids belief. Thus, children 
may view the existence of some agents as being more plausible than others, and the key to this distinction may be 
the associated behavioral requirements.  
Behavior stipulations for figures may also be expressed as cultural and community rituals. Henrich (2009) 
has argued that the ‘costliness’ of certain cultural actions are linked to the evidential value of the act - one would 
not perform such strange actions (like erecting a dead tree indoors and decorating it) if they did not think such 
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actions were justified by sincere belief. Broadly, the actions associated with beliefs, groups, and specific figures are 
culture-specific rituals ​[21–25]​, which are argued to be necessary for the transmission of culture-specific values 
and beliefs ​[26]​. Consider Christmas: many families independently perform the same kinds of behaviors for Santa, 
such as putting out milk and cookies (and a carrot for the flying reindeer), erecting and decorating a tree inside a 
house, wrapping presents, and eating certain kinds of food ​[27]​ in whole (or part) ​for​ Santa Claus. These behaviors 
are not just consistent within families over time, but consistent between families within culture. Given that diverse 
consensus of testimony leads to belief ​[18]​, diverse consensus of ​action​ may be just as (and possibly even ​more​) 
important. Rituals provide proxy evidence for the existence of such characters upon which children rely, as they 
demonstrate the actor’s dedication to, or conviction for, the specific figure ​[28]​. Thus we argue that figures who 
require specific behavior under certain conditions, which includes the performance of cultural rituals and norms, 
are more easily accepted and endorsed as ‘real’ by children than figures who do not - particularly at the aggregate 
level.  
            ​This study is the first attempt to present children with a range of real, cultural, and fantastical figures in 
order to determine whether children build a hierarchy of endorsement. ​We anticipate that children will vary in the 
degree to which they endorse these figures as real, consistent with a) the degree of direct evidence, b) the degree 
of indirect evidence, c) whether or not a child performs certain actions or rituals for the figure, and d) whether a 
figure is endorsed explicitly as fictional. We contend that certain kinds of rituals performed under specific 
conditions -- performed to appease or summon a figure -- are a powerful method for strengthening a child’s 
endorsement for a figure. For example, erecting a tree inside the house, or hunting for eggs, only happens on a 
specific period of the year; and only teeth (and not toenails) are placed under a pillow when they are lost from the 
body. We also anticipate that, based on the four qualities outlined, that a hierarchy of ​endorsement​ will be 
apparent in children’s belief scores - such that relative differences between figures will be apparent and ‘sensible’.  
 Of note, we use the term ​“figure” ​to broadly refer to all agents, entities, or persons presented in our 
study (irrespective of other qualities); and the term ‘sensible’ to describe the endorsement of these figures by 
adults. Finally, it is important to consider what exactly children and adults understand the term ‘real’ to mean. 
While we grapple further with the nature of this question in the discussion, it is worth noting that we approach this 
problem from two angles. We conceptualize responses to the question ‘​Do you think [the figure] is real?​’ as 
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‘endorsement’ [of reality status], rather than of belief [in reality status] ​per se​ (since we did not measure any 
behavior that might provide stronger evidence of a true conviction in a figure’s reality). That is, ‘belief’ describes 
the degree to which a participant authentically holds that a figure is real, while ‘endorsement’ can only be 
regarded as a self-report measure. We would also stress that this is a study focussed on the cultural processes that 
sustain ​endorsement​ at the level of populations, and not a specific study in individual differences or longitudinal 
developmental trajectories.  
Here we present ‘The Pantheon’, a list of figures and categories, as well as the associated beliefs and 
rituals for each figure that are typical in western contexts. In table 1 we define relevant terms associated with our 
figures, and in table 2 we outline the figures and their expected groupings within the pantheon. We anticipated the 
existence of these categories with respect to the 1) available direct evidence for the figure, 2) indirect evidence for 
the figure, 3) behavioral rituals and cultural norms associated with the figure, and 4) presence or absence of an 
explicit ‘fiction’ status. The categories and figures are presented in order of expected endorsement, as a function 




Table 1. Definition of terms.  
Term Definition 
‘Direct Evidence’ One has direct evidence of a thing when one ​has directly ​interacted, or in principle 
can directly​ interact, with the thing in question, via ordinary means.  
 
I.e., Charlie has direct evidence that the Eiffel Tower exists, as they have climbed  it.  
‘Indirect Evidence’ One has indirect evidence of a thing when one may not directly interact with a 
thing, but can interact with a proxy of a thing. Direct interaction with the thing 
would require extraordinary means.  
 
E.g., When Sammy thinks of a Homo neanderthalensis, they think of a walking, 
talking, cultural being who lived as recently as 40,000 years ago. Sammy has seen 
the bones of Neanderthals (and, as such, has indirectly interacted with them), but 
has not directly interacted with walking, talking, cultural being. It would be 
impossible to directly interact with a Neanderthal. 
Cultural rituals and 
norms 
‘Ritual’ for short; A term used to denote a set of behavioral norms and requirements 
performed in association with a thing.  
 
E.g.,  It is Peter’s birthday, they are turning 8. Peter expects a sweet cake with 8 
candles in it, people to sing ‘happy birthday’, and to receive gifts. Peters parents and 
guests anticipate satisfying these expectations.  
Fiction A thing that is not veridical, and known to have been the product of an intentional 
act of creation. Fictional things do not often make claims to being real.  
 
I.e., Harry Potter, while ostensibly human, is fictional, and is regarded as an 




Table 2. The Categories of Figures 




Figures that are both human and extant. They are real and are 
presented as such. Children have direct evidence, or recognize that 
direct evidence/interaction is possible (by virtue of the figure’s 
humanness). As with all humans, there are norms associated with 
the figure. 





Figures that do not exist, but are presented to the child as real, 
and done so culturally. These figures have cultural and social 
norms associated with their cosmology, such as rituals, and 
children receive indirect evidence in the form of gifts (ostensibly 
from the figure in question). 
Santa,  





Figures that were real, or are possibly real, and are 
presented to the child as such. Children have received, or may 
have received, indirect evidence of these figures’ existence (as 






Figures that are not real, which no standard norms associated with 
their endorsement at a cultural level, but which parents may 
idiosyncratically endorse. Children typically do not receive direct- 







Figures that are not real, and are presented as works of fiction, 






 ​The Figures 
Real figures. 
Our study includes two Real Figures (aggregated into the ‘Real’ category) - an adult known to the child, 
but who is not particularly close to the child (selected by the parent, and to be someone like a family friend, a 
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doctor, or teacher) and The Wiggles. The Wiggles are an Australian band who perform children’s music on a 
long-running TV show, and who regularly tour Australia, The US, The UK, and the United Arab Emirates. The 
Wiggles (or at least, the constituent members) are real humans, dressed like humans, and who appear on 
television as themselves - they are non-animated, and have typical physical and biological limitations. However, 
The Wiggles also share many qualities associated with animated, absurd, and impossible fictional agents, such as 
appearing on television, singing and dancing, and having friends who are impossible and who go on fantastic 
adventures. Given The Wiggle’s extensive touring, children may or may not have had the opportunity to directly 
interact with these figures - they are, however, extremely popular and widely known in Australia (the population 
under consideration). We expect by virtue of these figures’ obvious correspondence to human models in the 
child’s life that children understand that interactions with the Wiggles are in principle real (just as they are with 
real but non-present individuals in their lives), and that any interactions with The Wiggles will be governed by the 
same behavioral expectations and norms as any other real person, that they will report that The Wiggles are 
(highly) real, like a truly real person in their lives. Though it is the case that Wiggles are primarily known to the 
child via medium of TV, we believe this makes them an appropriate comparison group to the other figures (who 
are also known primarily via same and similar mediums).  
 
Cultural figures. 
Cultural figures share many similarities with real figures, despite the fact that they are not, in fact, real. 
Much like interacting with a human, cultural figures are associated with specific norms and behavioral stipulation. 
Additionally, from the point of view of the child, cultural figures also provide indirect evidence of their existence in 
the form of gifts. Moreover, they are broadly endorsed as real by reliable models in the child’s life, and in the 
media. However, the child does not receive direct evidence of the figure.  
One notable exception to this statement is Santa. In many parts of the Western world, a typical Christmas 
time ritual for parents is to take their children  to visit a live actor dressed as Santa in a public place, to tell children 
that this is the real Santa, to take a picture of the child with Santa, and for the child to tell  Santa of their desired 
gifts ​[8]​. Parents cite as their reason for visiting a mall santa their desire to make-believe and play with their 
children, as well as to increase their children’s belief in Santa ​[14]​.  Though we contend that meeting a magical 
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simulacrum in a mall or shopping is not quite the same as seeing, for example, a family doctor. It is an empirical 
question whether or not this makes a difference in endorsement for Santa relative to the Easter Bunny or the 
Tooth Fairy - and it appears that endorsement between these figures is not statistically different (as revealed by 
our own data). 
 
Ambiguous figures. 
While real figures and cultural figures share many similarities the relationship of these two groups to 
ambiguous figures is of particular interest. By ambiguous, we mean that children are exposed to ideas about these 
figures, mostly presented either as real (or at least possible), but without ritual or behavioral requirements, nor 
direct evidence of existence. Dinosaurs and aliens may exist in the world, or may not - but their existence does not 
impact how the child lives their lives. When children are exposed to these ‘ambiguous’ figures they are forced to 
make difficult evaluations. Frequently such figures are presented as real in principle, despite the fact that they 
share many qualities with figures that are real and not real respectively. Dinosaurs are similar to both lizards (real) 
and dragons (not real); while aliens are similar to any novel biological entity (say, a Capybara) even though the 
child may never have seen or experienced one first hand. While not perfectly equivalent, in the context of the four 
factors of testimony (direct- and indirect evidence, rituals/norms, and fictional disclaimers) that lead to 
endorsement, dinosaurs and aliens seem approximately equivalent: Ambiguous figures are endorsed as real by 
reputable individuals and may be supported by indirect evidence (various kinds of physical representations), but – 
importantly -- are bereft of cultural rituals or specific requirements for action. (We note that Aliens may not have 
indirect evidence for their existence, per se. However, to the extent that they are biologically plausible and may 
have vehicles that can travel into space (as we humans do), we have somewhat liberally defined them as 
ambiguous. Had we not, we may have had particular trouble in accounting for an adult understanding of these 
figures). A ‘reasonable’ understanding of such an agent would be to admit a degree of ambiguity, without 




Mythical figures are not real, provide no direct or indirect evidence of themselves, and are not associated 
with any kind of culturally prescriptive actions, but which parents may, or may not, idiosyncratically endorse as real 
via testimony (e.g. Unicorn; ​[29]​.  While we recognize that myth is culturally dependent, the distinction between a 
mythical and a cultural figure in this conceptualization is that cultural figures are associated with cultural rituals. 
When reading a story, for example, unicorns, dragons, and ghosts may be presented as real within the context of 
the story, and may even generate strong emotions in children, but their presentation is not culturally standardized; 
dragons may be cruel (per The Hobbit) or brave and kind (How to Train Your Dragon), unicorns may be pure (per 
Harry Potter) or murderous (Cabin in the Woods), while ghosts can be friendly (Casper), vengeful (Hamlet), 
lecherous (Beetlejuice), or paternalistic (Star Wars).  Importantly, none of our proposed mythical figures are 
associated with a standard corpus of behavior that supports their belief.  Note also that we are discussing a generic 
mythical agent (i.e., a ‘dragon’ rather than ‘Smaug’ or ‘Toothless’), and that such generic agents may receive 
occasional testimony in support of their existence (which is likely different from specific instantiations).  
 
Fictional figures. 
Finally, in contrast to real, generic mythical, and cultural figures are ‘fictional figures’, such as Peter Pan, 
Spongebob Squarepants, or Princess Elsa. These figures are not endorsed as real by adults, rather, they are 
explicitly presented to children as fictional; they are not associated with forms of evidence in favour of their 
existence, and are not associated with any cultural practices. In these instances, these figures ought to be ​prima 
facie​ not-real, and should occupy the tail end of a hierarchical scale of reality distinctions. 
 
Study 1. Online Data Collection.  
We examined endorsement for a range of figures among children (aged 2 - 11), and adults (over 18 years) 
in order to test the hypothesis that such figures feature in a sensible and relative hierarchy of endorsement (where 
‘sensible’ is defined relative to adult’s endorsement). We did so using a parent-as-researcher model, which we 
validated using more traditional methods in study 2. Parents were recruited via online advertisement and mailing 
lists, and gave consent via survey check-box.  
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The current study expands on previous work by comparing levels of endorsement in different kinds of 
figures ​[3,30]​, with specific reference to the four qualities associated with figures/categories: direct- and 
indirect-evidence for reality status, ritual and normative behaviors, and endorsement of fictional status. In so 
doing, we hope to empirically describe how children are evaluating various kinds of cultural representations 
relative to each other, and whether we see evidence for ambiguity within the spectrum of endorsement.  
The figures we presented to children were chosen based on whether their exemplar characteristics 
allowed them to fit clearly in one of our theorised categories (see Table 2). Both adult and child participants’ 
provided an endorsement score for the realness of each figure on a 9 point likert scale, as well as responding to 
questions related to the epistemological qualities of a subset of figures (see Supplementary material A) 
 
Stimuli, Hypotheses, and Analyses Plan 
We made the following predictions regarding our data: 
 
H1: ​We will observe the expected categorization of figures based on endorsement scores. 
H2: ​Children’s endorsement will conform to a hierarchical pattern consistent with the degree to which 
they are culturally and evidentially supported. 
H3: ​Adults’ endorsement of the realness of figures will be high for ‘real figures’, lower for ambiguous 
figures, and near floor for cultural, mythical, and fictional figures. 
H4:​ As age increases, children’s endorsement patterns will become more adult-like. 
  
Methods 
A note on data collection and analyses. 
Data collection for this experiment was executed over the course of 12 months in a longitudinal manner, 
and several additional hypotheses were proposed for this larger within-participants dataset. However, due to 
attrition we were not able to perform these planned analyses. We have included descriptive, but not inferential, 
statistics of our longitudinal data in Supplementary material A, as well as other information about this broader 
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research effort. What follows is a description and analysis of data from the first wave of data collection. We 
replicated our findings and present them in​ ​study 2).  
 
Recruitment Procedures and Participants. 
Using our lab databases, as well as our facebook page, we invited Australian parents to enroll their 
children in a year long study examining their child’s ​endorsement for various kinds of figures​. The first wave of the 
survey was conducted in July 2015 over a 3 week period. The administration of the study involved an online survey 
that the parent conducted with their child/children. In order to avoid incomplete responses and to avoid causing 
offence to parents, we asked parents to indicate which of the figures they were comfortable asking their children 
about. This was done to ensure that parents could omit any figures they felt were inappropriate (for example, 
some parents may wish to preserve in their children a belief in Santa, and so they were able to opt-out of 
Santa-related questions. This explains the varying number of responses between figures). In addition, parents 
agreed to a set of experimental protocols (common to any lab based study) to minimize bias (see Appendix A). 
A total of 154 children provided responses during the first wave of data collection. Surveys that did not 
include an answer to the final question of the survey were excluded (which was the only question asked of the 
parents specifically: ​Do you think your child was being truthful with you?​), among those that failed to answer the 
final question, none responded to more than 3 figures. A total of 95 children were included in the final analysis.  
An adult comparison group (N = 57) was recruited from an undergraduate research pool in exchange for course 




Children first participated in a number of practice questions in order to become familiar with the 9-point 
likert scale, which was visually represented as 9 grey stars which turned gold when clicked. These questions related 
to obviously false things, obviously true things, and confusing things. The goal of this task was to get children using 
the whole scale (see Supplementary material B for the full list).  
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Children were asked whether ‘Elephants’ and ‘Chairs’ were real, and data suggested the question was 
understood appropriately (respectively, M = 8.51, SD = 1.63; M = 8.4, SD = 1.99). On the more challenging 
questions of  whether ‘Floating Rocks’ (M = 4.64, SD = 3.41; ‘Short-nosed Elephants’ (M = 4.07, SD = 3.36) were 
real, it was clear, that the mid-points of the scale were used and understood by the sample, and that skewness and 
kurtosis were normal. The lowest scores were associated with the obviously false things, such as ‘singing chairs’ (M 
= 3.30, SD = 3.20); and ‘Upside down trees’ (M = 3.38, SD = 3.27).  
 
Target questions 
Children were asked to rate the realness of the 13 target figures (presented in random order) on the 9 
star likert scale, by answering the question “​Do you think [figure] is real?​”, with 1  stars indicating “​not at all real​” 
and nine stars indicating “​definitely real​”. We reduced all values by 1, so that ‘1’ responses - which qualitatively 
represented ‘not at all real’ were now represented by ‘0’ - which we argue is a more interpretable value.  During 
the first wave of data collection we failed to collect data on a real person (who is known to the child). This was an 




A total of 95 children were included in the final analysis. The mean age of these children was 5.12 years 
(SD = 2.17); the youngest child was 1.97 years, while the oldest was 11.10 years (age was calculated by 
determining days passed since the child’s reported birthday and the day of testing).  (As described previously, 
parents read the questions to their children, and honestly reported their child’s responses. While some may argue 
that a 2-year old could not provide useful data, we believe this is data worth having. We note that if we remove 
the three 2-year olds that results for the analyses presented hereafter do not vary. Our full data are available at 
https://osf.io/wurxy/​, and we invite readers to download it). Sex data was not collected. A total of 57 adults 
constituted the adult sample. Their mean age was 20.23 years (SD = 5.31). Eighteen of these participants were 
raised overseas, and all spoke English at a tertiary/university level.  A single adult, aged 48, was 5.23 standard 
deviations above the mean for age, and appeared to influence several regression values - inasmuch as we hope to 
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make age-relevant claims, this outlier is unduly influencing the predictive value of age as a predictor. For this 
reason, this single individual was removed from regression analyses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Do figures form into categories?  
Our first hypothesis was that  the figures would fall into five groups - real, cultural, ambiguous, mythical, 
and fictional (see Table 2) - due to the specific qualities associated with figures described previously.  We tested 
this hypothesis using a cluster analysis ​[31]​. Here, we have a population of children, who each provided a reality 
endorsement of up to 12 figures (or 12 ‘variables’).  Our aim is to identify whether those figures (variables) cluster 
together into ‘homogenous and distinct’ groups ​[32,33]​. Note: ​ At T1 we did not collect a child’s endorsement of a 
real person known to them (though we did at all subsequent time-points). Thus, we did not include ‘real person’ in 
the cluster analysis. 
The method of clustering employed here is the hierarchical method (using ​iclust​ function of the R-package 
Psych; ​Revelle, 2016) . First, we produce a correlation matrix (see Table 3) of the variables to cluster.  If we first 
accept that each participant has provided one observation per figure (in this case, there are 12 observations as 
there are 12 figures), then we can conceive of each of these observations representing their own cluster, thus, 
there are 12 clusters. The next step is to aggregate the two most highly correlated variables (figures) into a cluster, 
producing a total of 11 clusters. For each repetition of this aggregating procedure, there is a corresponding 
decrease in number of clusters. The ​psych​ package repeats this process until one of two measures of internal 
consistency fail to increase (cronbach’s alpha, 𝛂, or worst-split-half-reliability, 𝛽​;​ respectively; ​[31,34]​, or until 
there is only one cluster. An assumption of cluster analysis is that the variables are not too strongly correlated with 
each other variable (i.e., r > .9; ​[32,33]​. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of endorsement scores for each figure 
(note: only one of 12 correlations between figures exceeds this threshold - between Peter Pan and Spongebob; r = 
.945 and so does not pose substantive issues in interpretation). Meanwhile, the heuristic-rule for sufficient power 
to extract factors can be described by the formula: 2​c ​ (where ‘c’ is number of expected clusters, which in this case 
is five; ​[35]​. Thus, we have sufficient power to detect the 5 clusters predicted. In our case, our analysis created one 
super-ordinate cluster, which is to say, that the lower-order clusters have the same measures of reliability 
independent of whether we accept the single-cluster super-ordinate outcome, or a greater number of small 
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clusters. Because our hypothesis for the clusters were clear, and because the reliability values remain the same at 
all levels of aggregation, we extracted 5-clusters (see figure 1).   
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (r values) of ‘realness’ scores for figures.  













Wiggles -            
Santa 0.065 -           
Tooth Fairy -0.085 .548** -          
Easter Bunny 0.072 .741** .697** -         
Aliens -0.19 .514** .478** .481** -        
Dinosaurs .516** 0.071 0.031 .276* 0.175 -       
Ghosts 0.17 .356* 0.281 .364* .514** .321* -      
Unicorns 0.01 .547** .486** .573** .593** 0.289 .416* -     
Dragons 0.047 0.257 .428** .395** .583** .308* .453** .668** -    
Spongebob 0.281 .416* 0.269 0.348 0.337 0.174 0.294 .701** .518** -   
Princess Elsa 0.138 .431** 0.282 .448** 0.323 0.205 0.143 .854** .386* .739** -  
Peter Pan 0.195 0.413 0.542 .463** 0.387 0.203 0.385 .848** .422* .945** .793** - 
* deontes p < .05 




[FIGURE 1 HERE. ​A 5-cluster solution of the Child’s Pantheon​] 
 
The clusters generated and presented in figure 1 are fairly interpretable, however, it is not necessarily 
clear why  ‘Fictional (A)’ and ‘Fictional (B)’ are distinct. Allowing for a four-cluster solution (see figure 2), we find 
that Fictional A and B cluster together. Since the values of clusters within the hierarchy do not change with level of 
analysis, we retain a 4-cluster solution for the sake of interpretability.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, ‘Cultural Figures’ clustered reliably. We expected that Dinosaurs and 
Aliens would cluster together, however, we found that Aliens clustered with Dragons and Ghosts (the latter two 
were expected to cluster). We have termed this the ​ambiguous figures ​cluster, and we explore the nature of this 
cluster in the discussion. Similarly, we note that the ​mythical ​category has dissolved, such that unicorns now 
cluster with ​fictional ​figures. We have no immediate interpretation for this, except to say that the initial distinction 
between fictional and mythical may have been too fine. The primary notable difference is the new ​‘virtually real’ 
category: Dinosaurs clustered with The Wiggles. We believe this is because both are real, and both figures only 
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provide indirect testimony for their own existence. We interpret this as attributable to other forms of testimony 
children receive regarding the reality status of these figures; we note also the relatively low reliability statistics 
(which are a consequence of moderate correlation even if absolute endorsement appear to vary; i.e., Wiggles are 
endorsed more highly than dinosaurs in aggregate; see figure 3).  
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE. A 4-cluster solution of the Child’s Pantheon] 
 
Hypothesis 2: Do figures (and their categories) form a hierarchy?  
We predicted with Hypothesis 2 that children’s endorsement will conform to a hierarchical pattern 
consistent with the degree to which agents are culturally and evidentially supported. Figure 3 shows the 






[FIGURE 3 HERE. Childrens endorsement scores for individual figures and categories] 
 
In order to determine whether there was a sensible hierarchy of endorsement, based on the derived 
categories, we conducted a Multilevel Model in which age was the predictor variable and ‘belief’ was the outcome 
variable, where we allowed y-intercepts to vary (i.e., we let each category of figures have it’s own y-intercept 
value) and freely estimated slopes (i.e., the beta value associated with age could vary as a function of category). 
Note that the results were conducted on the categories of figures and not the individual figures. We imputed 
missing values using the ​mice()​ package ​[36]​, which imputes missing values for each variable based with separate 
regression models (with stochastic variation), each of which includes values from all other variables. For example, a 
missing value for ‘Fictional Figures’ is imputed based on the beta value of age, as well as the beta values associated 
with each other figure category. The stochastic variation includes an estimated error term, in so doing, each 
datapoint is imputed with variance around the regression line - the value of this is that it compensates for an 
overestimation associated with regression-imputation alone ​[36]​.  
We identified that a model with a fixed y-intercept (Model I) for all categories was significantly improved 
by a model with freely estimated y-intercepts (Model II),  SD = 1.27, 𝜒​2​(3) =103.14, ​p​ < .001, suggesting a multilevel 
model might be appropriate. Next, we introduced age as a predictor (Model III); Model III was a significant 
improvement on Model II, 𝜒​2​(4) = 10.94, ​p​ = .001, indicating age (as a fixed effect for all categories) predicted 
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endorsement​. The correlation between the category codes and regression intercepts  ​r​ = -.411, indicating that as 
age increased endorsement decreased. Next, we introduced freely estimated slopes for age (Model IV) as we 
expected that age would be differentially predictive of ​endorsement​ according to category. We found that Model 
IV was a significantly better fit than Model III, SD = .29, 𝜒​2​(6) = 32.62, ​p​ < .001, and the slopes and intercepts were 




[FIGURE 4 HERE. Results of the Multilevel Model in which a child's age interacts with category of figure.] 
 
Table 4. Results of iterative regression models for determining hierarchy of belief. 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV​x 
Age  - - -.168 -.168  
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Observations 475 475 475 475 
Log Likelihood -1144.203 -1092.631 -1087.159 -1070.850 
Note: *** p< .01; x = Final Model.  
 
It is important to note that the beta values associated with any given category (per figure 4) should not be 
interpreted independently from the other beta values within the model. That is, figure 4 and Model IV reveal that 
age interacts with category to predict endorsement. 
 
Hypothesis 3: What does an ‘adult-like’ understanding look like?  
Our third hypothesis was that adults’ endorsement of the realness of figures would be high for ‘real 
figures’, lower for ambiguous figures, and near floor for cultural, mythical, and fictional figures.  
Figure 5 shows adults endorsement of all individual figures. As can be seen, endorsement for the majority 
of figures is effectively zero, with very little variation. Due to this low variation we cannot conduct the cluster 
analysis to determine equivalent categories. However, visual inspection reveals that adults endorse real figures 
near ceiling, and the figures constituting ‘cultural, mythical, and fictional’ categories at floor. The only notable 
exception is that of Ghosts, which are endorsed with a mean value of 2.26 (SD = 2.89), suggesting considerable 
idiosyncratic variation. Aliens are endorsed at middling rates, while dinosaurs appear to be endorsed at high rates 
by most participants, and floor rates by a few. Thus, we suggest there are three categories for adults - real, unreal, 
and ambiguous (with ghosts and aliens constituting the latter).  
 
Hypothesis 4: Does age predict a more adult-like understanding of figures?  
We predicted that as children age their endorsement will become more adult-like. It is clear from the data 
presented in Figure 4 that the negative slopes associated with fictional characters that age negatively predicts 
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endorsement​ between participants. That is, ​endorsement​ for figures within that categories declines with age - 
which, predictably, will converge on values of ​endorsement​ reported by adults for the same figures. With regard to 
real and ‘virtually’ real individuals, the positive slope suggests increasingly adult-like ​endorsement​ - that is, as 
children age, they recognize the reality of those figures (or perhaps, are better able to sensibly interpret the 
question). Notably, the slope for Cultural Figures, while nominally negative, is largely flat. We have two possible 
explanations for this: the first is that children who do not believe in these cultural figures, when reporting to their 
parents, are partially motivated to deceive their parents that they actually do. The second is that belief in cultural 
figures is likely an S-shaped curve, where belief declines precipitously around the ages of 7 or 8 ​[37]​, and that 
having fit a linear model, we are unable to capture the true nature of this effect. Study 2 addresses the former 
concern. We also note that our data contains proportionally fewer children over the age of 7 than it does under. 
Unfortunately, only future research will address this. 
We observe three intermediate values among adults, aliens, dinosaurs, and ghosts (see Figure 5 for all 
values) among the ‘ambiguous figures’. By the spread of data, aliens and ghosts are regarded as ambiguous as 
evinced through the use of middling values; dinosaurs are generally strongly endorsed through a skew is 
introduced by a minority who do not affirm their reality.  We note that the difference between adult and children 
scores was not significant for Aliens, t(91.89) = 1.616, ​p​ = .110, and Dinosaurs, t(109.95) = .809, ​p​ = .421 (as were 
non-parametric tests). However, adults collectively endorsed Ghosts at significantly lower levels than did children, 







[FIGURE 5 HERE. Endorsement for figures for adults and children.] 
 
Discussion 
In study 1 we observed that a cluster analysis broadly supported our prediction that figures would cluster 
into specific categories. Importantly, cultural figures -- those associated with cultural rituals and specific behaviors 
-- formed their own category, while other figures formed clusters with similar-others, even though some specific 
elements were off.  We observed, through the use of a multilevel model, support for the claim that these different 
categories had differential base-rates of endorsements, consistent with the proposed hierarchy (as evinced by the 
model fit in which y-intercepts varied), and that belief was predicted by age differentially according to category. 
Relative to adult scores, children’s scores revealed that developmental changes would produce broad convergence 
on adult-like (or ‘sensible’) levels of belief.  
We note that some degree of imputation was used to arrive at these results, and that some aspects of 
data collection (such as the use of parents-as-research-assistants) may raise questions about the accuracy of our 




Study 2.  Research Assistant collected data. 
Recruitment Procedures and Participants. 
Between the months of April and July, a trained research assistant (RA) from [redacted university] 
attended a Science Museum [details redacted] in a capital city of Australia, in order to collect a corresponding 
sample of children. The protocol was the same as with study 1, save for the following changes. The RA approached 
parents in the foyer of the public science museum, and invited them to involve their children in this research 
project. Parents were then briefed, and gave consent for their child to participate. Parents indicated which figures 
the child ​should not​ be asked about by the RA, and provided the name of a real person known to the child. Data 
was collected using an iPad, and children were encouraged to interact with the iPad themselves.  
Due to operational and time constraints, we were able to collect responses from 82 children (though one 
child was excluded for not completing the task). In total, our final dataset included 81 children. The mean age of 
these children was 6.17 year (SD = 1.79) [Original mean = 5.12, SD = 2.17]. The youngest child was 3.44 years 
[original 1.97 years] while the oldest was 11.67 [original 11.10 years]. As can be seen in table Table 5, rates of 
consent for each figure were considerably higher in the replication dataset, as were the proportion of responses to 




Children first participated in a number of practice questions in order to become familiar with the 10-point 
likert scale, which was visually represented as 10 stars which turned gold when clicked. These questions related to 
obviously false things, obviously true things, and confusing things. The goal of this task was to get children using 




Table 5. The proportion of children for whom permission was granted for each figure (in each dataset), and the 
proportion thereof who subsequently provided endorsement scores.  
 Original Dataset Replication Dataset 
 Permission  Response  Permission  Response  
Real Person - - 1.00 0.90 
Wiggles 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.86 
Santa 0.94 0.78 0.99 0.91 
Tooth Fairy 0.93 0.69 0.99 0.93 
Easter Bunny 0.94 0.81 0.99 0.89 
Alien 0.91 0.55 0.98 0.95 
Dinosaur 0.98 0.85 1.00 0.88 
Ghosts 0.88 0.54 0.94 0.84 
Unicorns 0.94 0.51 0.99 0.90 
Dragons 0.96 0.54 0.96 0.87 
Spongebob 0.88 0.36 0.99 0.83 
Princess Elsa 0.95 0.53 0.99 0.85 
Peter Pan 0.91 0.41 0.99 0.83 
 
Target questions 
Children were asked to rate the realness of the 13 target figures (presented in random order) on the 10 
star likert scale, by answering the question “​Do you think [figure] is real?​”, with 1  stars indicating “​not at all real​” 
and 10 stars indicating “​definitely real​”.  
 
Results 
All analyses were identical to those of Study 1, and the R code we used to conduct the study is available 
on open science framework (​https://osf.io/wurxy/​) 
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Hypothesis 1: Do figures form into categories?  
Table 6 documents the  correlation matrix. No correlation exceeded .9, and so the pattern of relations 
does not substantially challenge our analysis; Per our original analyses, we ran a cluster analysis on our data 
allowing for 5 categories, and not including ‘Real People’ (see figure 6). As before, we found that a ‘Cultural 
Figures’ cluster emerged, as well as a ‘Fictional Figures’ cluster. However, we observed some differences: 
Dinosaurs and The Wiggles did not aggregate (in the primary dataset this cluster had relatively low reliability). 
Dragons, Aliens, and Ghosts aggregated as before, but this time the cluster also included Unicorns (which had 




Table 6. Table of correlation between figures (with correlations from main manuscript in parentheses).  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Real Person -             
2 Wiggles -0.05 -            
3 Santa -0.07 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
-           
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[FIGURE 6 HERE. Cluster analysis with a 5 cluster solution. ] 
 
Hypothesis 2: Do figures (and their categories) form a hierarchy?  
We predicted that children’s endorsements will conform to a hierarchical pattern consistent with the 
degree to which agents are culturally and evidentially supported. Below, we show descriptive statistics (Mean and 
95%CI) for children’s endorsement of each figure and each category (Figure 7). Note that for figure 7 that the 
original data is plotted 0 - 8, and replication data is plotted 1 - 10. We are not making a direct inferential 
comparison between the two dataset (as they were collected under different circumstances, and with a slightly 
different scale), though we hope to illustrate that the same broad descriptive patterns are apparent in the 




[FIGURE 7 HERE. Plot of original vs replication endorsement values for figures.] 
 
[FIGURE 8 HERE. Plot of original vs replication endorsement values for categories.] 
 
Per study 1, we conducted a multilevel model. However, given ​a priori ​analyses, we simply compared the 
null model to a full model which included freely estimates intercepts and slopes (i.e., Model IV). We identified that 
a model with a fixed y-intercept (Model I) for all categories was significantly improved by the full model with freely 
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estimated y-intercepts and slopes (Model II), 𝜒​2​(6) =224.00, ​p​ < .001, The correlation between the category codes 
and regression intercepts  ​r​ = -.634, indicating that as age increased endorsement (generally) decreased. This is 
apparent in figure 9 and table 7. 
 
 




Table 7. ​Results of the regression models for determining hierarchy of belief. 
 Model I Model II 
Age (Beta; SE) - -.387 (0.207) 
Constant (int; SE) 7.020  (0.182)*** 9.462 (1.028)*** 
Observations 378 378 
Log Likelihood 1014.300 -902.299 
Note: *** p< .01 
 
Discussion of study 2 
Study 2 served three purposes: First, to replicate observations made in study 1, second, to determine 
whether the parent-as-research-assistant model was valid, and third, to collect data with fewer missing values.  
The present dataset was collected by trained research assistants in a large, metropolitan science museum. Due to 
time constraints, we were able to collect data from 81 children (compared to 95 in our original final dataset). While 
study 2 did not contain individual children as young as those in study 1, we note that only  very few children were 
younger than those in the present dataset. One unintentional difference between study 2 and study 1 was that the 
children in study 2 were recruited at a Science Museum. One potential implication is that these children may be 
more science-savvy than the children in Study 1. To what extent this influenced the data, we cannot know, yet we 
did observe remarkable similar observations, clusters, and model results. The most salient difference in the results 
of these analyses was the beta value associated with cultural figures. Specifically, in study 1 age only weakly 
predicts belief, while in study 2 this relationship is considerably stronger. We propose that the nature of this 
relationship is probably non-linear, where belief declines abruptly (and possibly totally), rather than gradually. That 
said,  we are generally confident in our central claim that belief in a range of real and unreal figures conforms to a 
typology, and we predict that - beyond typical forms of testimony - that rituals and cultural norms associated with 
cultural figures are a special form of testimony. We hope that it is apparent that this replication, conducted by 
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trained research assistants, has yielded results that should give any reader confidence in the method of 
parent-collected data and the results of Study 1.  
 
General Discussion 
To our knowledge this is the first study to examine the relative hierarchy of children’s reality 
endorsements across a range of figures. We made several predictions. First, that figures would aggregate into a 
priori categories. Second, that children’s endorsement would conform to a hierarchical pattern consistent with the 
stated criteria. Third, adults’ endorsement of the realness of figures formed basic categories with less ambiguity. 
And fourth, age would predict endorsement patterns that converge on sensible ‘adult like’ ​endorsement​. We 
found broad support for each hypothesis in two separate studies. We are also eager to note that the method by 
which we collected data - by recruiting parents online, who subsequently acted as research assistants - appears to 
have yielded results that do not meaningfully or systematically differ from results collected by trained research 
assistants. 
Regarding our first hypothesis, we identified that 12 figures aggregated into four clusters which broadly 
corresponded to our predictions. This pattern we observed is most easily seen in Figures 1 and 2.  Our second 
hypothesis was that children’s endorsement would conform to a hierarchical pattern consistent with our stated 
criteria, and our fourth hypothesis was that endorsement among children would become more adult-like with age. 
Using multilevel analyses, we identified a clear hierarchy, one which becomes increasingly apparent among older 
children (i.e., the regression lines diverge at different rates, and are most different amongst the oldest age group)1
..  Our third hypothesis, that adults would have three categories of figures - real, not-real, and ambiguous - was 
also supported.  
Regarding the interaction between categories of figures and age: The biggest deviation in our results from 
our hypothesis was that dinosaurs and aliens did not aggregate. But rather, dinosaurs aggregated with The Wiggles 
in study 1 and that dinosaurs and wiggles did not aggregate in study 2. We termed this cluster ‘virtually real’ as 
children have had no direct evidence of either figure, and yet both figures are/were real - presumably according to 
1 ​In technical sense, these differential values are associated with a greater model fit when we freely estimated the 
slopes of each categories relative to a model in which we constrained the slopes to a single regression coefficient 
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different criteria. Children appear to recognize that the wiggles are extant, and that dinosaurs were once extant. 
Indeed, in study 1 we observed that the difference in endorsement scores between Dinosaurs (and Aliens) was not 
significant between children and adults. This suggests that children (as a group) appear to have an already stable 
and adult-like understanding of Dinosaurs (and Aliens). 
We had hypothesized the existence of a ‘mythical’ cluster - of unicorns, dragons, and ghosts - which did 
not materialise (though we do note that dragons and ghosts did not differ in levels of endorsement (Study 1: ​p​ = 
.351; Study 2, ​p​ = .066) that dragons did not differ from unicorns (Study 1: ​p​ = .909; Study 2: ​p​ = .091) and that 
unicorns did not differ from ghosts (Study 1: ​p​ = .057). (In study 2 the difference was significant, t(58) = 2.955, ​p​ = 
.005, such that Unicorns, M = 5.45, were more endorsed than Ghosts, M = 3.406). Rather, unicorns clustered with 
fictional figures (in study 1), and with dragons, aliens and ghosts (in study 2); while dragons and ghosts clustered 
with aliens (in both studies). We note that Adults tended to endorse aliens and ghosts at relatively high levels 
(relative to each other, and other figures), but did not strongly endorse unicorns. Indeed, we were surprised at the 
levels adults endorsed ghosts. Children endorse ghosts significantly more than adults, but only by a small margin. 
And yet, aliens, ghosts, and dragons all provide the same amount of evidence for their own existence, make no 
demands on believers (inasmuch as behavior is concerned) and are all idiosyncratically presented in media (as evil, 
friendly, benevolent, greedy, generous, and so on). Any attempted explanation of this would be post hoc 
speculation, and so we hereby refrain, and look forward to future research efforts. The fictional cluster needs little 
discussion, except to say that age predicts declining ​endorsement​ more strongly for this category than any other.  
As predicted, we found that Santa, the Tooth Fairy, and the Easter Bunny aggregated into the ​a priori 
category of ‘Cultural Figures’ in both studies. We believe that this is primarily a consequence of cultural rituals, as 
outlined in the introduction. At least at the population level, it is the case that many families practice acts 
associated with these figures, and that these acts are relatively standardized across the group. While the present 
analysis is not sufficiently controlled to quantify the influence that such rituals and behaviors play, we note that 
the decline in ​endorsement​ for cultural figures is considerably less steep than the decline in ​endorsement​ for 
ambiguous and fictional figures in study 1, but is roughly as steep as it is ambiguous figures in study 2. While our 
model assumes a linear relationship between age and belief for these figures, we suspect it is actually non-linear in 
real life (a point to be examined by future research). An additional point of discussion is that children are likely 
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exposed to more information about Santa than the Tooth Fairy or the Easter Bunny. Though it’s largely an 
empirical question as to how much exposure children receive for all the figures in studies, we maintain that 
Cultural Figures are qualitatively different from other figures - particularly their nearest-endorsed-neighbors, aliens 
and dinosaurs - as they are coupled with rituals and behavioral norms. 
The results of our multilevel model expands on existing findings, which has shown that ‘more than half of 
8 year olds are still in transition [to disbelief in santa]’ ​[7]​ and that most, but not all, 9 year olds have abandoned 
belief in Santa ​[8]​. Blair, McKee, & Jernigan ​[38]​ report similar findings. Our MLM shows that there appears to 
something interesting happening between the ages of 7 and 9 with regard to declining endorsement, such that the 
figures which we predicted to be least endorsed assume the lowest rank in the pantheon, while it is in this period 
that ‘virtually real’ figures (such as dinosaurs and humans appearing on television) appear to assume a higher 
standing than that of cultural figures (primarily observable in study 2). Speculatively, we believe this relationship is 
more pronounced than described by our models: we suspect that belief does not decline linearly (as our models 
assume) but may in fact be non-linear, such that after a critical threshold is crossed, belief dissipates. That said, 
only future research, using longitudinal methods and non-linear modelling may resolve this question. We leave the 
point open to future researchers.  
Our hypothesized structure was based primarily on the following features: 1) direct evidence, 2) indirect 
evidence, 3) ritual and behavioral norms associated with the figure, and 4) explicit presentation as fiction. We 
tentatively argue that behaviors associated with figures - specifically, cultural rituals and behavioral norms - are a 
key feature that supports the endorsement of cultural figures at rates approaching that of real figures (conceding 
explicitly that this was not an experimental design). Of course, we can only make inferences to this causal factor in 
the present work, and we have no data to show what kind of behavioral commitments were apparent in the lives 
of the children we studied. (Though we have work in preparation in which this was the focus).  
We should note, however, that we are not attempting to dismiss the role that various kinds of testimony 
play ​[30]​, nor the particular language used in such testimony ​[39]​, nor the source ​[39,40]​. Rather, we would like to 
elevate in significance the potential role that cultural rituals and behavior play as a source of evidence alongside 
these well established features (keeping in mind that participation in ritual has been described previously as a 
special kind of testimony, albeit theoretically rather than empirically;​[13]​). Our intention was to conduct 
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longitudinal analyses in order to test this hypothesis more directly (see supplementary material A), but were 
scuttled by issues associated with missing data (in lieu of these analyses we have presented descriptive statistics in 
Supplementary material A). 
We would also like to emphasise the quality of the data collected in Study 1 - where parents administered 
the survey to their children - as evinced by its similarity to the data collection in Study 2.  We found no systematic 
or meaningful differences in our data (save for the fact that RA collected data contained fewer missing values). We 
broadly replicated the factor structure, multilevel model, and hierarchy within this data (as well as finding strong 
age effects for each category in linear regression models). We hope that this replication attempt bolsters support 
for the present findings, and - more broadly - reveals the value of using parents as research assistants: provided 
sufficient guidelines and briefing, it appears that parents may be able to efficiently and honestly report the belief, 
opinions, and preferences of their children, at least to a degree comparable with a research assistant unknown to 
the child. The extent to which either method (parent vs. RA) introduces idiosyncratic biases is unknown, but the 
net-results suggest that neither method is empirically inferior to the other in the present context (save for the 
advantage that RA’s appear to generate less missing data - though this may be due to the nature of the topic, 
rather than a function of data collection). Largely, we believe that the parent-collection model may be an efficient 
way to collect data of acceptable quality, even on topics that might be intuitively considered difficult (such as belief 
in figures like Santa).  
We believe there are three primary limitations, and some additional, smaller limitations. The first primary 
limitation, is that children may ‘meet’ some figures in real life, thus having something like direct evidence for the 
figure; second, the emotional impact and valence of the figures likely plays a role, and this was not accounted for; 
and third, what exactly does ‘real’ mean in this context. This work should be considered a first attempt at 
demonstrating the ​presence​ of a hierarchy (rather than a dissection of stated phenomenon), and a sincere 
advancement of the hypothesis (stated by authors elsewhere) that rituals play an important role in facilitating 
belief in non-natural figures. We also advance the ​hypothesis​ that rituals are a special form of testimony, rather 
than confidently asserting it is a known and quantified ​explanation​.  
Regarding direct evidence for non-natural figures: nearly 41% of all children who responded to questions 
about Santa reported having seen him in real life (the same proportion as those who claim to have seen the 
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Wiggles; see Tables S1A-B in Supplementary material A). Though we argue that cultural figures do not routinely 
provide ​direct ​evidence of their own existence, but rather that they provide ​indirect ​evidence of their existence 
(i.e., gifts, chocolate, and money, respectively). We do not at presently know how many children would report 
having seen the Easter Bunny or the Tooth Fairy, but the extant literature suggests that the Santa data is not 
surprising. At least in the United States (noting that our sample was Australian) children often visit a ‘live Santa 
Claus’ in shopping centres and malls, with many visiting two or more live Santas per year ​[14]​. In these situations, 
children get to interact and physically be in the presence of a cultural figure, promoted as “​the real thing”​. This 
said, that the Tooth Fairy and The Easter Bunny are endorsed at comparable levels to Santa suggests that either 
direct evidence is not that important (which is highly unlikely), or that ritual participation is surprisingly powerful. 
Similarly, it is also somewhat popular for actors to dress as Princess Elsa as various kinds of events, and so it is 
possible that some number of children have also ‘met’ Princess Elsa. However, this practice is somewhat distinct in 
that children are less likely to seek out Elsa, and do not engage in a typical and predictable set of culturally dictated 
customs (sitting on Santa’s knee, describing oneself as good or bad, and making a wish for a present).  
With regard to emotional valence and impact: it is likely that the concrete positive associations of the 
cultural figures contributes to a child’s endorsement of these figures - in classic learning terms, Santa, the Easter 
Bunny, and the Tooth fairy provide positive reinforcement for a position favourable to their existence, and it’s hard 
to make such a claim for any other figure in our pantheon. Moreover, the figures in our list all have positive 
associations, even those that may also be represented as negative (e.g., dragons, ghosts). We did not, for example, 
include more classically negative figures like vampires, or zombies (nor more esoteric but undeniably ‘evil’ figures 
like succubi or lich). While there were ethical reasons for us to not include such figures, we speculate that ‘bad is 
stronger than good’ ​[41]​, and acknowledge that there is some evidence that ‘scary’ stimuli are more easily 
represented by children than non-scary stimuli ​[4]​, though this effect fails to replicate in a similarly powered (albeit 
underpowered) study ​[42]​. Though Kapitány et al. (under review; preprint available) describe the short-cominings 
of empirically inculcating any kind of supernatural belief, and so while we believe it’s possible (and even likely) 
emotional valence and intensity play a role, we cannot conclusively draw on any empirical data. 
Finally, an important criticism for this work, as with similar research, is what exactly we mean by the term 
‘real’,​ what exactly children understood the term to mean ​[43,44]​, and the nature of the measurement. These 
37 
questions are legitimate, and a full discussion is beyond the scope of the present enquiry and the philosophical 
expertise of the authors. However, we understand the term ‘real’ here to correspond with ​‘confidence in the claim 
that [the figure] exists or has existed in some embodied and autonomous way’.​ That we find middling rates of 
endorsement for a number of agents (among all populations studied) indicates not that something is real and 
unreal at the same time, but that one has a ​middling-confidence​ that a thing is real. One potentially problematic 
aspect of this can be highlighted by adults’ responses to ‘Dinosaurs’. There was a small number of floor responses 
for dinosaurs, which may reflect a belief that dinosaurs - though once real - are no longer real. However, some 
small proportion of those responses may also reflect the beliefs of religious fundamentalists. Largely, however, we 
think these floor responses - though small in number - are legitimate, and should in aggregate be taken to 
represent the diversity of respondents understandings of the term ‘real’ (indeed, some children anecdotally 
reported that dinosaurs are ​no longer​ real, which appears to us to represent a relatively sophisticated 
understanding of the term, and should be taken into account when the same children report that Santa ​is​ real). We 
also note that the measurement we used - particularly for fictional figures - tended to cluster at the floor and the 
ceiling producing a potentially misleadings ‘mean’ value. While regrettable, we note that the same problem does 
not occur for the ambiguous and cultural figures, which tend to reveal middling endorsements ​by individuals​ (in 
the former case; as revealed by the scatter plots of individual values in figure 7), and high confidence in their 
existence in the latter. During the peer-review process, a reviewer suggested that rather than the multiple 
categories we propose, it may be more sensible - based on an interpretation of mean values for ​category​ data (see 
Figure 8) - to suggest only three categories: ​real​, ​less real​, and ​doubtful​. We are not opposed to a ‘clumping’ 
strategy over a ‘splitting’ when making future hypotheses about this proposed pantheon. The question all 
researchers ought to ask is: what utility do my distinctions serve? In the present case, we had rather fine-grained 
hypotheses about the structure of the pantheon, and wished to report and interpret at a corresponding level. 
Certainly three, rather than five, categories may serve some purposes particularly well, though we hope that our 
data - imperfect that it is - can serve as a foundation for future theory-building based on the relative contribution 
of different forms of evidence and testimony, as described in brief by Woolley and Ghossainy ​[13]​.  Future research 
may examine the nature of these differences and similarities using alternative statistical and theoretical models, 
though we again note that our data is publicly available for the interested reader, and we are open to future 
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discussion and collaboration on this topic. We maintain, however, that our results, measurement, and analyses 
suggest that children are generally capable of admitting nuance and ambiguity into their reality endorsements, and 
this is apparent at population levels. That said, that we replicated our results in a second study using traditional 
methods of enquiry should provide some confidence that the question is reliable and face-valid.  
In anticipating some critique, one might question how sensible it is to include 3-year olds in the present 
dataset. Our original intention was to examine longitudinal differences, and so to observe the degree to which 
children vary over the course of the year, and in response to cultural events. While we were unable to run these 
analyses, that’s not to suggest the inclusion of the youngest might not yield meaningful aggregate data. Indeed, if 
the youngest have the greatest noise to signal ratio, it doesn’t necessarily skew our results, and may more 
accurately inform us of the nature of changing beliefs during the earliest years. That said, we re-examined all 
analyses and excluded children 3-years and younger, and found no meaningful or statistical differences in our 
results (primarily because there were so few that young in our sample).  
The data we present here suggests that, when children (and even adults) are asked to report their 
subjective confidence that various kinds of real and non-real figures exists, they are not only able to do so, but do 
so with nuance, and in a consistent pattern apparent at the population level. We argue that the possibility that 
cultural rituals and normative requirements on the part of figures like Santa, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy 
may be very powerful cultural tools that lead to children believing such figures are real. And we anticipate - but 
cannot address directly - that ritual involvement is a key determinant in adult beliefs for more institutional 
supernatural figures such as the deities of major world religions. We hope that treating the corpus of real, 
supernatural, and fictional figures as a kind of ​pantheon​, united by a coherent structure of underlying qualities, 
opens the door for higher resolution understanding of how children come to understand what is real and what is 
not (even when they are wrong), and allow for more nuanced approaches to research when investigating the 
predictors of belief and endorsement. In addition to testimony, content, and source information, we must pay 
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Parents agreed to the following conditions before helping their child complete the survey.  
 
In conducting this kind of research, it's very important that all children who answer these questions answer them 
under conditions that are the same. For that reason, we would hugely appreciate you following these simple 
instructions.  
  
1. Please do not correct or guide your child to a particular answer, or correct your child if they provide a 
'wrong' answer.  
2. Please read text to your child as it is written. Sometimes you may need to change some of the words for 
the benefit of your child, so please only alter the delivery consistent with the spirit of the question. Please 
be careful to observe point 1.  
3. If your child asks you questions, please answer them as best you can without guiding your child to a 
particular response. If this seems impossible, please say to your child "Good question, how about I answer 






Supplementary material A. 
 
A note on data collection and analyses. 
Data collection for this experiment was executed over the course of 12 months in a longitudinal manner, 
and several additional hypotheses were proposed for this larger within-participants dataset. However, due to 
attrition we were not able to perform these planned analyses. In the body of the manuscript we have included 
analyses for hypotheses based on the data from the first wave of data collection. Here we will describe how data 
were collected over the course of the year, and present the values as appropriate. Our full datasets are available 
online at ​https://osf.io/wurxy/​, and we urge interested readers to access this data.  
We also intended to ask children were asked a number of epistemological questions regarding each 
figure. These questions were collected primarily to inform longitudinal data, which would have been considerably 
more highly powered. Moreover, due to the number of target figures, and the fatigue such questions can impose 
on children, we asked these questions of only a limited number of targets at each timepoint. Ultimately we asked 
children about each target figure twice, separated by roughly six months. However, due to attrition this data is not 
particularly informative. Hereafter, we will present summary statistics from the first wave of data collection, and 
direct motivated readers to our publically available data if they wish to view the rest of the data (available on the 
https://osf.io/wurxy/​). 
 
Recruitment Procedures and Participants 
Data recruitment and collection was the same at each subsequent time point as was described in the 
body of the manuscript. After the first wave of data collection, subsequent data collection were conducted on 
average every 52 days. In total, we collected data a total of 7 times. Each administration of the study was as 
described in the body of the manuscript. 
 
Data Collection 
After the first wave of data collection, we recognized that missing data on figures might be the participant 
using ‘0’ to indicate complete lack of belief, or may simply represent missing data. Thus, after the first time point, 
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children were asked to confirm (using a binary scale) their disbelief, so that we could determine whether a 
non-response on the focal question was a response of zero-endorsement, or simply missing data. 
 
Longitudinal Hypotheses 
In addition to the ‘static’ hypotheses described in the body of the manuscript, we made several 
hypotheses regarding the longitudinal data.  
 
H5:​ We will conduct longitudinal analysis on category of figures to determine whether or not children’s 
belief becomes more adult-like (i.e., declines) over the course of one year’s development. 
H6:​ We will conduct longitudinal analysis on individual cultural figures (i.e., Santa, Easter Bunny, and 
Tooth Fairy) to examine whether or not time of year (i.e., corresponding to specific ritual events, such as 
Christmas and Easter) influences belief. 
H7:​ Contingent upon a significant and positive increase at belief associated with time of year, we intended 
to explore whether or not there was a halo effect associated with time of year, such that belief in other 
figures increased during Christmas or Easter (i.e., is christmas really ‘a magical time of year’).  
 
Data Treatment 
At T1 data were collected on 9-point likert scale (presented in the form of gold stars for children). 
However, after our first round we identified that a missing value on this scale may be a missing value, or an 
indicator of lack of endorsement. In wave T2 through T7 we used an 8-point scale, and employed a radio-button 
that participants could select to confirm that ‘​[They] did not think [x] was real​’ (if present, participants were scored 
a ‘0’ on the likert scale, thus making it a 9-point scale in total). Data in T1 were converted such that their original 





In the following tables S1A-D we present the absolute and proportional values of responses for children’s 




Tables S1A - D. Responses to epistemological question for four figures. 
 
 
Children’s Belief Longitudinally 
Our hypotheses involved conducting longitudinal analyses in order to to determine whether or not 
children’s belief becomes more adult-like (i.e., declines) over the course of one year’s development. Our sixth and 
seventh hypotheses were our most novel, and proposed that belief for individual cultural figures (i.e., Santa, Easter 
Bunny, and Tooth Fairy) may have fluctuated with the time of year (i.e., with figure-specific corresponding ritual 
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events). We had hoped to identify if Christmas and Easter, respectively, would temporarily increase belief for Santa 
and the Easter Bunny. We were unsure, a) if this would occur at all, and b) if it did occur, would it occur before, 
during, or after the event (corresponding with different levels of engagement and testimony). The tooth fairy was 
to be included as a control condition, as visitation by the tooth fairy are uniformly distributed through the year. 
Further, we wished to explore whether or not large culturally ritualistic events had a kind of halo effect for other 
figures - was christmas really a ‘magical time of year’, so to speak, and would it increase belief in other figures. 
Unfortunately, we noted considerable attrition, such that of the 95 children who participated at T1, only 
seven individuals participated in all seven timepoints, 12 participated in 6 or more, 22 participated in five or more, 
and 44 participated in four or more. Moreover, of this subset, not all children answered all questions at each 
timepoint. While it would be possible to impute values, it would corrupt the integrity of the analyses to such an 
extent that any interpretation would be meaningless. Thus, we do not present our intended longitudinal analyses 
here. However, we have also included plots for each time point. More importantly, our data (for each time point) is 
publicly available at ​https://osf.io/wurxy/​, as is our R code (thus making all figures and value reproducible).  
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Figure S1. Plots of endorsement for Time 2 (Early September, 2015)  
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Figure S2. Plots of endorsement for Time 3 (Early November, 2015) 
 
Figure S3. Plots of endorsement for Time 4 (Mid December, 2015)  
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Figure S4. Plots of endorsement for Time 5 (Mid February, 2016)  
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Figure S5. Plots of endorsement for Time 6 (Early April, 2016)  
 




Supplementary material B. Training questions 
 
The following are the training questions, presented in order, for the primary study: 
 
1. Are chairs real? 
2. Are chairs that sing real? 
3. Are elephants with long noses real? 
4. Are elephants with short noses real? 
5. Are rocks that float in water real? 
6. Are trees that grow upside down real?  
 
The following are the training question, presented in order, for the replication study. Each answer was re-inforced 
with the child. For example, if they selected 10/10, or 1/10, the experimenter (without correction or judgement) 
clarified that the child had endorsed, or denied, the existence of the thing in question. For the Blergo, scores 
greater than 1 were reinforced with the clarification that “​Ok, remember a 'Blergo' was something I just made up in 
my head. There are no right or wrong questions, just remember that if you say a number bigger than 1, you're 
saying that it is sort of real. “ 
 
[read to the child] ​The next question I will ask you is how 'real' do you think the penguin is. If you think it's really 
real, as a real as your mum or your dad, you should make all 10 stars yellow. If you think that a Penguin is not real, 
that's ok. If you think Penguins are not real at all, you should select only 1 star. If you're not sure, then you should 
select a different amount of stars. If you think it's probably real, then choose a big number of stars, if you think it's 
probably not real you should choose a smaller number of stars. 
 
Do you think that Penguins are real?  
 
54 
[read to child] ​Ok, I'm going to ask you about a thing I just made up. It doesn't really exist. It's just an idea that is in 
my head. Do you think that a 'Blergo' is real?  Remember: If you think a Blergo is really real, as a real as your mum 
or your dad, you should make all 10 stars yellow.  If you think that a Blergo is not real, that's ok. If you think a 
Blergo is totally fake, you should select only 1 star.  If you're not sure, then you should select a different amount of 
stars. If you think it's probably real, then choose a big number of stars, but if you think it's probably fake you should 
choose a smaller number of stars. 
 
Do you think that a 'Blergo' is real? 
 
[read to child] ​I want you to think of an Elephant now. But I want you to think of a special Elephant, one that has a 
short nose. Remember, 10/10 means that it's really real, 1/10 means it's not real at all, and numbers between 1 
and 10 are in the middle! Do you think that Elephants with short noses are real? 
 
Do you think that Elephants with short noses are real? 
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